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Authenticity is an important ethical concept. It is also a potentially confusing one, due 
to the variety of ways in which it has been used throughout its history. Artifacts such 
as paintings or dollar bills can be described as authentic or inauthentic. In such cases, 
the attribution of authenticity suggests, as indicated by the Oxford English Dictionary, 
that something is “what it professes in origin or authorship...genuine.” But more 
importantly for a discussion of the concept within bioethics, people and their choices, 
actions, and lives are also assessed in terms of their authenticity. The term is then 
susceptible of a wider range of possible meanings (even though it can still be used in 
a similar sense to that relevant to inanimate objects), which this entry will attempt to 
spell out. Despite this plurality of meanings, however, authenticity is typically 
assumed to be a desirable thing. In the healthcare context, for instance, it is deemed of 
crucial importance that a patient’s decision, say to refuse treatment, should be 
authentic; if there are grounds for thinking that it is not, this may be taken to mean 
that it is permissible to override it. Authenticity is also usually viewed as a significant 
consideration in the private conduct of one’s life. As Charles Taylor, among others, 
has pointed out, many people in Western society – especially since the 1960s – are 
committed to the moral ideal of living an authentic life, a life that is uniquely their 
own. This use of the concept has for example become salient in the debate on the 
ethics of human enhancement. 
 
 A brief history of the concept 
 
As traditionally conceived, authenticity fundamentally involves the idea of being true 
to oneself. This idea, however, can itself be understood in different ways. One major 
sense, connected to the OED’s definition of “authentic” given above, has to do with 
sincerity: being true to oneself, on this construal, means accurately representing who 
one is, including one’s beliefs and feelings, to others. This is the sense already found 
in the famous lines spoken by Polonius in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, in which the 
character advises his son Laertes: 
 
 This above all: to thine own self be true, 
 And it must follow, as the night the day, 
 Thou canst not then be false to any man. (Act 1, scene III) 
 
In his classic work Sincerity and Authenticity, Lionel Trilling precisely argues that 
sincerity really came to prominence as a value in Western society at about the time 
Hamlet was written, the late sixteenth century. While this value retains its importance 
through the following centuries, it is only once being true to oneself starts mattering 
beyond the fundamentally public virtue of sincerity that the moral ideal of 
authenticity is truly born. Taylor traces this development of the ideal in The Ethics of 
Authenticity, through Rousseau and, in particular, Herder and the Romantic 
movement. For the Romantics, we should be true to ourselves not simply for the sake 
of presenting our true colors to others, but also, more importantly, because of the 
intrinsic value of expressing and realizing our fundamental, inner nature. For one 
thing, this means realizing our best capacities, resulting for instance in the creation of 
great works of art. But an even more pressing reason for living authentically is, on 
this view, that this true self or inner nature is the ultimate source of knowledge for us 
about how we ought to live, about what a good life means for each of us as the 
individual (s)he is. As Taylor puts it, “there is a certain way of being human that is my 
way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone 
else’s” (p.29; emphasis in original). 
 
In the twentieth century, however, the Romantic tenet of a true self in accordance 
with which one ought to shape one’s life came under attack from existentialist 
philosophers, with whose thought the term “authenticity” is perhaps most closely 
associated. This criticism is most evident in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre 
adamantly rejected the idea that we have anything like a true self, a rejection most 
radically expressed in his early work Existentialism and Humanism, where he 
famously maintained that “[m]an is nothing but that which he makes of himself” 
(p.28). To believe as the Romantics did that features one hasn’t chosen can even 
partly define who one is represents, for Sartre, just an instance of bad faith, the very 
opposite of authenticity. Authenticity for Sartre means avoiding bad faith by facing up 
to the fact that we are fundamentally free to write the story of our life, and thus 
fundamentally responsible for the kind of person we become; there is no pre-given 
self laying down in advance the path we ought to follow. 
 
 
Two contrasting approaches to authenticity in analytical philosophy 
 
The contrast between the Romantic view of authenticity and the Sartrean one is 
reflected in the more general contrast drawn by some authors (such as Erik Parens and 
Neil Levy) between accounts of authenticity that emphasize self-discovery, and those 
that focus on self-creation. The main analyses of authenticity stressing self-creation 
that have been proposed after Sartre tend to acknowledge more explicitly the limits 
that constrain our ability to shape ourselves as we wish. They do, however, still reject 
the idea of a pre-given self providing guidance as to how to live authentically – unless 
such a self is identified with our highest-priority values and commitments. 
Authenticity, according to the self-creation approach, involves living our life in 
accordance with these. No further constraints are placed on the authenticity of our 
choices and actions: for instance, someone could in principle make an authentic 
decision to radically change her physical appearance and psychological make-up, 
provided that she did so in keeping with her core values and commitments. This 
approach thus treats authenticity as closely related to – if not identical with – the 
notion of autonomy, understood broadly as self-governance in the light of one’s 
highest-priority values. In The Importance of What We Care About, Harry Frankfurt 
can be read as providing an analysis of authenticity as autonomy: on this account, 
acting authentically means acting on the basis of desires that one wholeheartedly 
endorses. The notion of wholeheartedness implies the absence of ambivalence in 
one’s second-order endorsement of those first-order desires, as well as the absence of 
any inconsistency between one’s second-order attitudes. David DeGrazia’s account of 
authenticity in his book Human Identity and Bioethics is in many ways similar to 
Frankfurt’s, though DeGrazia views autonomy as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of authenticity. Honesty, in the sense of accurate presentation (both to 
others and oneself) of who one is, is required as well (pp.108-12). 
 Detailed, systematic expositions of the self-discovery approach to authenticity are 
more difficult to come by in analytical philosophy. Nevertheless, supporters of that 
approach can be said to share the following two ideas. First, each of us does have 
something like a true self, a set of traits (not limited to our values and commitments) 
which, taken together, define who we fundamentally are, and do so whether or not we 
happen to endorse them. Secondly, authenticity entails living in accordance with such 
a true self, that is to say, expressing it, when appropriate, in our behavior (rather than 
hiding or repressing it), or preserving it even when we might be tempted to change it, 
for instance because it would promote some of our interests. Some passages in 
Taylor’s Ethics of Authenticity can be taken to provide one of the most comprehensive 
outlines of the self-discovery model, though it is not fully clear to what extent Taylor 
is willing to accept the idea of a true self that includes things beyond a person’s 
values and commitments. Bernard Williams also expressed an affinity with that 
model. As he summed up to journalist Stuart Jeffries: “If there's one theme in all my 
work it's about authenticity and self-expression... It's the idea that some things are in 
some real sense really you, or express what you [are] and others aren't.” Among 
bioethicists, Carl Elliott and the President’s Council on Bioethics have also endorsed 
a true self approach to authenticity. They differ, however, in the exact way they 
understand the notion of a true or authentic self. While the President’s Council 
appears to identify it with an essence of some kind, Elliott does not. 
 
In light of those descriptions, the distinction between the self-discovery and self-
creation approaches shouldn’t be interpreted too rigidly. Versions of the self-creation 
model less radical than Sartre’s, such as DeGrazia’s view, do make some space for 
the possibility of self-discovery. They do not rule out, for instance, that we might 
discover what our fundamental values and commitments are. Conversely, not all 
variants of the self-discovery approach posit an essential, unchangeable self. Some – 
perhaps the more plausible ones – do allow that we can to some degree deliberately 
shape who we authentically are, by working on ourselves to develop new traits and 
skills. Still, there remains an important difference between even the more moderate 
versions of each approach: DeGrazia, for instance, is keen to stress that only those of 
our features that we identify with, and have made part of our own self-conception, can 
define who we are fundamentally, that is, our identity as individuals. 
 
It should finally be mentioned that the various accounts considered so far are 
primarily aimed at offering a criterion for the authenticity of our choices and actions, 
rather than our psychological features, such as our emotions, desires, or moods. 
Authenticity in relation to such features has usually been discussed in a separate 
literature. Some authors, however, do use criteria that echo those described above. 
Kevin Mulligan, for example, has argued that authentic emotions must escape rational 
and willful control, stressing, in the spirit of the self-discovery model, the need for 
spontaneity; other authors differ, stating instead that an authentic emotion must 
simply cohere with our autonomously formed values and beliefs (see Kraemer for a 
summary of that debate). Given that discussions about authenticity in bioethics are 
often concerned with the alteration of our psychological make-up (including our 
emotions or moods) for purposes of treatment or enhancement, such discussions 
might benefit from taking into account both of these bodies of literature on the 
concept of authenticity. 
 
The following sections will consider the relevance of that concept to three areas of 
debate in bioethics: end-of-life decision-making, the technological enhancement of 
human beings, and the treatment of mental disorder. 
 
 
Authenticity and end-of-life decision-making 
 
The issue of authenticity arises in the medical context when a person must decide 
whether or not to undergo some treatment to save her life. It also arises when 
someone seeks help with actively ending her life, in countries – like the Netherlands – 
where practices like euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are legal. The question 
then is whether the person’s expressed wish (say, to end her life) is authentic or not. 
This wish may be directly expressed by the person at the present time, or it may have 
been formally expressed in the past through an advance directive, the latter being 
relevant when the person is now regarded as lacking decision-making capacity, for 
instance as a result of a neurodegenerative disease. In either case, however, the 
concern about the authenticity of the person’s request has to do with whether it 
accurately reflects her preferences and values. The relevant sense of authenticity at 
stake here is thus analogous to autonomy as conceived by Frankfurt or DeGrazia. It is 
considered important to ensure that someone’s decision to end her life should be truly 
her own, and that it should not have been distorted by false or incomplete 
information, or by social pressures. If a person’s choice is indeed judged authentic in 
this sense, the conclusion will usually be that it ought to be respected. 
 
In such cases, considerations of authenticity are viewed as taking precedence even 
over the patient’s best interests. Consider an adult person who, on religious grounds, 
refuses a blood transfusion that would almost certainly save her life. Many would 
regard her decision as going against her own interests. Nevertheless, the consensus 
among doctors is that this decision should not be overridden if it is a genuine 
expression of the person’s core values. Best interests can carry more weight in cases 
where a patient has lost capacity, and no formal expression of her wishes regarding 
treatment is available. Even then, however, they need not be the decisive 
consideration. If the person deciding on behalf of the patient (the “surrogate”) 
possesses sufficient knowledge of the latter’s beliefs and values, she is supposed to 
try and determine what the patient would have chosen if she still had capacity. In 
other words, the decision she reaches should ideally be an authentic reflection of the 
patient’s values and beliefs. Again, such a decision might not necessarily coincide 
with what most would regard as the patient’s best interests. 
 
The self-creation approach to authenticity seems of greater relevance than the self-
discovery one to the question whether a person’s decision to refuse life-saving 
treatment (or her request to be helped to die) should be respected. Even if such a 
person possessed, for instance, great artistic gifts, few would argue that this would 
justify paternalistically overriding her refusal of treatment on the grounds that she 
should keep on living in order to give full expression to her authentic self. That said, 
such considerations might legitimately be appealed to in an attempt to convince the 
person to change her mind. They might also appropriately figure in her own decision-
making process: “Art still needs my contribution, I must go on.” This suggests that 
while the self-creation model is more relevant to issues of public regulation, the self-
discovery one might be more important for the more personal question of how one 
ought to live. 
 
 
Authenticity and the enhancement debate 
 
The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have seen a growing interest in 
questions of authenticity within the debate on the technological enhancement of 
human beings – particularly so-called “neuroenhancement”, the process of 
intervening into a healthy person’s brain, using procedures like psychoactive drugs or 
brain stimulation, to modify her mood, personality, or other psychological features in 
desired ways. A key impulse behind that debate was the publication in 1993 of 
psychiatrist Peter Kramer’s book Listening to Prozac. In it, Kramer describes some 
patients who no longer meet the strict criteria for depressive (or any other) disorder, 
yet are reportedly transformed by the use of the drug, in ways many would judge 
desirable. Vulnerable, shy, and unconfident people become resilient, assertive, and 
socially savvy, with such benefits for their social and professional lives that some of 
them asked Kramer to remain on Prozac even once they were no longer considered at 
risk of relapsing into depression. Kramer’s account raises a general worry, shared by 
authors like Elliott and the President’s Council. While this kind of neuroenhancement 
might seem to carry great benefits, doesn’t it threaten the authenticity of the subject 
being enhanced? 
 
This worry needs to be spelt out further. It is sometimes suggested that the enhanced 
individual will not be the same person as the initial one, and that this is inherently 
problematic. However, as DeGrazia as shown (pp.231-2), this suggestion seems based 
on a failure to sufficiently distinguish between different senses of the phrase “being 
the same person”, or of the idea of individual “identity”. It seems implausible to think 
that the technological alteration of our personality or mood must produce a 
numerically distinct individual, with the implication that the original one has simply 
been destroyed. An alternative line of argument states instead that the qualitative 
changes to the person’s identity produced by neuroenhancers are problematic from the 
perspective of authenticity. Yet why should they be regarded as such? One of the 
strongest arguments offered for that conclusion is Elliott’s suggestion that mood 
brighteners like Prozac might disconnect certain people from the appropriate sense of 
alienation they are experiencing in the face of a world that is amiss. His worry is that 
the drug might make the person feel better at the cost of silencing the voice of her 
authentic self, a voice that might not be pleasant yet is nevertheless a source of 
important insights about her life circumstances. (See Elliott’s piece “The Tyranny of 
Happiness”.) 
 
Authors like DeGrazia have responded to Elliott by arguing for a different 
understanding of the notions of authenticity and identity. Suppose that someone 
experiencing the feelings of alienation described by Elliott wants to get rid of them 
with the help of Prozac. To the extent that this person doesn’t identify with her sense 
of alienation, this feature is not part of her identity on DeGrazia’s view. Therefore, 
removing it through pharmacological means does not threaten her authenticity. It will 
not betray anything like a true self. On the contrary, the person’s decision to shape her 
psychology in this way can be fully authentic, provided that it is in line with her 
values and preferences, and does not involve deception of any kind. This brings us 
back to the fundamental disagreement between the self-discovery and the self-
creation approaches to authenticity. 
 
Neil Levy has proposed a way of resolving the conflict between these two 
approaches, using an analogy with people who choose to undergo sex reassignment 
surgery on the basis of their feeling that they are, for instance, really a woman trapped 
in a man’s body. Such cases, Levy argues, illustrate the fact that enhancement 
technologies can actually help people become who they really are, allowing their 
authentic self (as the self-discovery model understands it) to shine through. He thinks 
that claim should be extended to the use of pharmaceuticals like Prozac for 
enhancement purposes, and concludes that regardless of which approach to 
authenticity one subscribes to, the use of neuroenhancers can be seen as promoting 
our authenticity. The statements made by some of Kramer’s patients, who claimed 
that they were “no longer themselves” without Prozac, do seem to lend support to that 
conclusion. Yet while Levy seems right that the self-discovery model does not 
warrant a systematic condemnation of enhancement use as inauthentic, it has 
nevertheless been argued that this model is in fact more conducive to worries about 
authenticity than the self-creation one (see Erler). If so, the debate between the two 
camps is not at an end yet. 
 
 
Authenticity and mental disorder 
 
A third context within bioethics in which the concept of authenticity has received 
much attention is the treatment of mental disorder. The issues here largely overlap 
with those raised in relation to the enhancement debate – unsurprisingly, since both 
discussions focus on interventions into the brain involving similar procedures 
(antidepressants like Prozac, stimulants like Ritalin), only for different purposes 
(treatment vs. enhancement). Indeed, these interventions were originally designed 
with the aim of treating psychological disorders like depression or Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and their enhancement potential was only 
discovered accidentally. The issue of authenticity has been discussed in relation to 
various groups of people with mental disorder. Ilina Singh has studied children with 
ADHD; Ineke Bolt and Maartje Schermer have interviewed adults with the same 
condition. Tony Hope and colleagues have interviewed female patients with anorexia 
nervosa, while David Karp has related the experiences of people with depressive 
disorder. In all of these contexts, a key question that arises particularly for patients 
and their relatives is whether medication that treats the disorder undermines the 
person’s authenticity. The worry that it might do so is arguably less widely shared 
than the corresponding worry in relation to neuroenhancement, yet some patients 
(and, in the case of children with ADHD, their parents) do give voice to it. Others, by 
contrast, take the view that medication actually helps restore the authentic self that 
had been masked by pathology – a view with which many clinical practitioners would 
agree. Alternatives are to regard both the disordered and the “well” self as equally 
authentic, or to simply reject the notion of an authentic self altogether. Patients who 
feel that medication takes away part of their identity by removing the disorder 
sometimes suggest that they are thereby being deprived of intrinsically valuable 
features, such as spontaneity or creativity in the case of ADHD. But the worry about 
losing part of oneself does not seem to systematically depend on the assumption that 
the relevant aspect of one’s identity is valuable independently of its being part of 
oneself. 
 
What do the philosophical perspectives on authenticity considered above imply in this 
sort of cases? For advocates of the self-creation model, concerns about authenticity 
are only appropriate when a patient does not clearly endorse her motives for seeking 
treatment, or the changes that the medication produces in her. If she does endorse 
them wholeheartedly or autonomously, her use of medication must count as fully 
authentic. It is unclear whether supporters of a true self analysis of authenticity will 
want to disagree here. This will depend on whether or not they are prepared to accept 
that mental disorder can be part of a person’s authentic self. While several of the 
authors mentioned earlier in this section agree that the self-discovery approach can 
help illuminate discussions of mental disorder and authenticity, they understandably 
tend to avoid taking a firm stand on the nature of the relation between the two. In 
favor of the view that mental disorder necessarily overshadows a person’s authentic 
self, one might stress the common intuition that treating clinical depression through 
medication does not fundamentally change who the patient is, but simply restores her. 
However, as mentioned previously, this intuition is not universally accepted with 
respect to all forms of mental disorder. To this should be added that the way the 
concept of mental disorder is applied by the medical profession at any point in time 
does not stand beyond criticism. Some characteristics, like homosexuality, were once 
viewed as disorders but are no longer so, and some that are still so classified in the 
2000 version of the DSM manual, edited by the American Psychiatric Association, 
have been said not to deserve that label. Allan Horwitz and Jerome Wakefield have 
made such an argument in relation to certain forms of depression that they regard as 
normal responses to distressing life circumstances – something strongly reminiscent 
of Elliott’s idea of “good” alienation, alienation bound up with authenticity. 
 
Finally, it has been suggested that some people with mental disorder find the concept 
of a true or authentic self useful when coping with their condition. For instance, Hope 
and colleagues have reported that some patients with anorexia nervosa find it helpful 
to conceptualize their authentic self as the healthy, non-anorexic one, viewing by 
contrast their anorexia as an inauthentic part of themselves, against which they are 
struggling (p.23). Such observations raise the question whether the concept of a true 
self can be of use to clinical practitioners trying to help their patients get better. 
Another question is whether, even when the concept does appear to help a patient in 
her process of recovery, her use of that concept might still in principle conflict with 
the actual truth about who she “really” is – assuming of course there is such a truth. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
While it is commonly accepted that authenticity is a significant moral value, there are 
different ways of thinking about the concept, leading to conflicting positions on 
certain issues in bioethics. The self-creation approach, with its emphasis on 
autonomy, seems most relevant to questions about regulation and respect for people’s 
decisions, whether to refuse treatment or to use some neuroenhancer. It is commonly 
agreed that if these decisions are authentic, they should be respected, provided they do 
not harm others. The self-discovery model of authenticity, on the other hand, might be 
more relevant to how we should live our lives, and how we should encourage people 
to live theirs, either directly or by influencing the general social ethos. It also suggests 
some important concerns about technological interventions into the brain, whether for 
treatment or enhancement purposes, that the self-creation approach tends to neglect. 
That said, supporters of the self-discovery model have typically not spelt out their 
views as fully as those on the other side of the debate. There clearly remains room for 
further discussion on the question whether the idea of an authentic self can be 
construed in a plausible manner, as opposed to being merely studied from a 
sociological perspective; and if it can be so construed, what its exact nature is, and 
how – if at all – the technological interventions previously discussed might threaten a 
person’s proper relation to that self. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
American Psychiatric Association. 2000. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 4th edition, text rev. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Bolt, Ineke & Schermer, Maartje. 2009. “Psychopharmaceutical Enhancers: 
Enhancing Identity?” Neuroethics 2:103-11. 
 
DeGrazia, David. 2005. Human Identity and Bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Elliott, Carl. 1998. “The Tyranny of Happiness: Ethics and Cosmetic 
Psychopharmacology.” In: Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications, 
pp.177-86, ed. Erik Parens. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press,  
 Elliott, Carl. 2003. Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream. 
New York; London: W.W. Norton. 
 
Erler, Alexandre. 2012. “One Man’s Authenticity Is Another Man’s Betrayal: a Reply 
to Levy.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 29(3): 257-65. 
 
Hope, Tony, Jacinta Tan, Anne Stewart et al. 2011. “Anorexia nervosa and the 
language of authenticity.” Hastings Center Report 41 (6): 19-29.  
 
Horwitz, Allan V. & Jerome C. Wakefield. 2007. The Loss of Sadness: How 
Psychiatry Transformed Normal Sorrow Into a Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Karp, David A. 2006. Is It Me or My Meds? Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Kraemer, Felicitas. 2009. “Picturing the Authenticity of Emotions.” In Emotions, 
Ethics, and Authenticity, pp.71-90, eds. Mikko Salmela and Verena Mayer. 
Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
 
Kramer, Peter. 1993. Listening to Prozac. New York: Viking Press. 
 
Levy, Neil. 2011. “Enhancing Authenticity”. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (3): 
308-18. 
 Parens, Erik. 2004. “Kramer’s Anxiety”. In Prozac As a Way of Life, pp. 21-32, eds. 
Carl Elliott and Tod Chambers. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1980 [1946]. Existentialism and Humanism, translated by Philip 
Mairet. London: Methuen. 
 
Singh, Iilina. 2005. “Will the ‘Real Boy’ Please Behave? Dosing Dilemmas for 
Parents of Boys with ADHD.” American Journal of Bioethics 5 (3): 34-47.  
 
Taylor, Charles. 1991. The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
The President’s Council on Bioethics. 2003. Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the 
Pursuit of Happiness. New York: Dana Press. 
 
Trilling, Lionel. 1972. Sincerity and Authenticity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
OTHER RESOURCES: 
 
authenticity, n. Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, 1989; online version March 
2012. URL = <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/13325>. 
 
Jeffries, Stuart. “The Quest for Truth”. The Guardian, 30 November 2002. Available 
online, URL = 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2002/nov/30/academicexperts.highereducation>. 
 
Alexandre Erler 
Research Associate 
Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics 
University of Oxford, United Kingdom 
